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Abstract

In light of the recent controversy surrounding the validity of race conscious
redistricting, the practice of creating congressional districts with an African
American or Hispanic majority population, an important question arises; are the
votes of African American congresspersons even critical to the passage of policy
issues salient to the African American populace. This study seeks to prove that the
votes of African American congresspersons are crucial to the passage of House
policy issues salient to the African American community. To prove this hypothesis
this study analyzed the voting cohesion and pivotal voting bloc influence of each
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) member of both the lO2nd and l03rd Congress on
policy issues deemed salient to the black community per the CBC' "Black Agenda".
The object is to determine whether the votes of the lO2nd and l03rd Caucuses,
played an essential role in the passage of policy issues salient to African Americans.
Non-CBC Democrat cohesion was also examined pertaining to these issue in order
to ascertain the level of support non-CBC Democrats gave in the House passage of
the corresponding issues. The finding demonstrate not only are the votes of CBC
members necessary, but more African American Congresspersons, who are sensitive
to black issues and who are willing to vote cohesively with the CBC, are needed to
seriously promote and preserve policy issues of most importance to African
Americans.
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Race Redistricting and the Congressional Black Caucus 
Who needs em'!?: Gauging the Essentiality of African
American Congresspersons

The year was 1993, twelve southern blacks settled into their newly
elected congressional seats, raising the number of seats held by African
Americans Democrats from 26 of 269 Democrats in the House in the 102nd
Congress to 38 Of 258 in the 103rd U.S. Congress. For almost a century
African Americans were absent from the southern congressional
delegations of North Carolina, Alabama, Florida, South Carolina and
Virginia; they were absent from Louisiana's congressional delegations
until 1991, Mississippi until 1987, Tennessee until 1975, and Georgia and
Texas until 1973 (Higginbotham, Clarick, & David, 1994 ). Race
redistricting, the practice of creating congressional districts with an
African American or Hispanic majority population (Cohen, 1995), has made
it possible for African Americans, particularly in the South, to elect
representatives of their choice, which in turn has given a political voice
to the historically voiceless. It has made it possible for African American
Representatives to swell the minority ranks of the U.S. Congress; which in
turn signaled the gneiss of a revitalized and influential Congressional
Black Caucus (CBC).
Historically, African American members of Congress, have not only
represented their district, but shouldered the hopes, needs, and desires of
the entire African American community (Franklin & Moss, 1994; Lusane,
1994). This political tradition started more than a century ago by the first
black congressmen, Senator Hirim R. Revels of Mississippi and
Representative Joseph H. Rainey of South Carolina, and is still being
perpetuated by more than 10,000 black elected officials throughout the
United States (Terkilden, 1993; Christopher, 1976).
Black representation in the current 104th Congressional Black
Caucus totals forty-one members, with seventeen Representatives from
the southern United States, one Republican Representatives, a delegate
from the District of Columbia and one, Carol Mosely Braun of Illinois, in
the Senate. Although an all-time high, this is proportionately a modest
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number for the countries largest minority of nearly 34 million (Census
Bureau, 1996; Mills, 1990).
Prior to the 1990 round of redistricting, many argued that in order
for black policy concerns to be nationally addressed, it was imperative to
have black legislators to seriously promote these interests (Hatchett,
1986). For generations African Americans were systematically ignored or
depreciated in the arena of politics; minority majority districts were to
remedy this past discrimination. Based on the premise that white voters
are reluctant to vote for black political candidates, black majority
districts were created to give African Americans an equally weighed vote
in electing a representative of their choice (Terkildsen, 1993; Canon,
1995). It was assumed that in drawing these race conscious districts,
blacks would chose someone who looked like them, on the premise that
they would in accordance, preserve and promote public policy issues that
would have a positive impact on the African American community.
Blacks representing blacks became a common theme that ran through
the process of the 1990 redistricting efforts. Due to the CBC' acquired
image as national black leaders of the African American community, it
was only natural for the majority of blacks to welcome additional
advocates of black concerns to the Caucus. However, many found this
codependency disturbing. The majority opinion in Reno v. Shaw (1993)
articulated by Justice O'Connor summed up the concerns of many outside
of majority minority districts looking in when she declared "when a
district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common
interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe
that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that
group, rather than their constituency"( 113 S. ct 2816, 1993). Many
Americans agree with Justice 0' Connor's opinion and have engaged in
Fierce debate and litigation in expousing their sentiments (Fein, 1993).
The invalidation of the new minority majority district could
possibly return the CBC' membership votes to its prior status. Many
African Americans have expresses their outrage at the thought of losing
any of the minority majority district representatives; contending that the
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successful passage of legislation salient to African Americans is
dependent upon the voice of the CBC, and a reduction in numbers could
prove devastating to the black populous (Lusane, 1994). However one critic
finds it a racist assumption that race determines a voter's concern for a
particular political issue and that blacks are ideologically monolithic on a
number of issues (Cohadas, 1994). That same author contend that "what
some call 'black' issues such as AIDS, drug abuse, teenage pregnancy,
crime, welfare, health care, education or affirmative action", are not
concerns that can only be addressed by African Americans (Cohadas,
1994).The 104th U.S. Congress' Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich has
recently dealt a serious blow to the ability of the CBC and other subgroups
to promote the interests of their particular constituencies. Gingrich
achieved this by cutting budget appropriations for these caucuses in an
effort to eliminate the divisive and pivotal influences these alliances may
have in the House (Swain, 1996).
In light of recent develops that threaten the survival of the CBC, the
important question becomes, are the votes of African American
congresspersons even essential to the passage of policy issues salient to
the African American populous. To answer this question, this study
examines the level of voting cohesion and pivotal voting bloc influence of
each U.S. House Caucus and non-Caucus Democrat of both the 102nd and
103rd Congress on particular issues deemed salient to the Black
community per the CSC' "Black Agenda" (Clay, 1992; CBC, 1975). The
object is to determine whether the votes of the 102nd and 103rd CBC
members, play an essential (pivotal) role in the passage of policy issues
salient to African Americans. Non-CBC Democrat cohesion of U.S. House
members is also examined pertaining to these issue in order to ascertain
the level of support non-CBC Democrats give in the passage of policy
issues of particular concern to Black Americans. These two Congresses
were chosen because of the dramatic effect minority majority
redistricting practices have had on CBC membership from the 102nd to the
103rd congress. In order to explore this area successfully, this study
begins with a discussion of the constitutional and congressional
provisions pertaining to the African American electorate and then moves
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to U.S. Supreme Court decisions on redistricting. A literature review
pertaining to the voting cohesion and pivotal voting bloc influence of the
CSC in general, is followed by this study's analysis of the CSC and non
CSC House Democrat's voting cohesion and pivotal voting bloc influence on
policy issues salient to the African American community. This paper
concludes with suggestions for future research pertaining to
congressional redistricting and minority representation .
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Congressional Provisions

Constitutional
Amendments
African American political participation began after the Civil War.
Four million African Americans emerged from the shadows of slavery,
envigored with the possibility of freedom and justice (Franklin & Moss,
1994). In the years just after the Civil War, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, with the help of federal legislation enforcing them, opened
the ballot box to recently freed African Americans. For a few years
African Americans in the South, under the protection of the United States
government, enjoyed the rights and privileges of democracy in
approximately the same way as whites did. However, in the wake of the
1870s Post-Reconstruction era whites revolted against the new found
power of the black electorate. Whites moved to limit and finally abolish
the democratic rights of African Americans. Mass chaos and terror were
elected upon African Americans throughout the South after the
government withdrew its protections of African Americans. Starting in
the 1870s and continuing into the middle of this century, southern whites
deployed a variety of tactics including violence, ballot-box fraud, poll
taxes, literacy tests, appointed offices and the white primary to
disenfranchise African Americans (Baer, 1983). The vast majority of
southern African Americans were still denied the right to vote during the
first half of this century. The voting barriers began to tumble down with
the assistance of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
ratified in January 1964, outlawing the requirement of poll taxes, long a
means of disfranchising blacks in the South (Franklin & Moss, 1993). But
African American continued to face Fierce opposition to their
enfranchisement.
Civil

Rights Acts
African Americans sought relief of the political oppression they
were experiencing, through the federal courts. However the court declined
to involve itself in the business of the states. After intense pressure from
civil rights advocates, violent unrest and fierce congressional debate, the
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Civil Rights Act of 1957 was enacted. This legislation opened up the court
system to politically oppressed African Americans, by authorizing the
federal government to bring civil suits in its name in order to obtain
injunctive relief in federal courts, when anyone was denied or threatened
in his or her right to vote (Franklin & Moss, 1993). The Civil Rights Act of
1960, strengthened its predecessor, to prevent evasive action by
registrars, who failed to register qualified African American voters
solely on the bases of race (Franklin & Moss, 1993). The Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was the most far reaching of the Acts in support of racial
equality ever enacted by Congress. It gave the attorney general additional
power to protect citizens against discrimination and segregation in
voting, education, and use of public facilities (Franklin & Moss, 1993). The
three Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 were enacted to curb the
sundry practices of
the Southern political system, but for the most part they proved
unsuccessful (Grofman & Davidson, 1992). Although there was a notable
decline in voter discrimination, the period following the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was marked by strong resistance to its
enforcement and considerable violence in some places.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965
On August 6, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was signed into law
(Grofman & Davidson, 1992). Its initial purpose was to do what the Civil
Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 could not effectively do, remove
obstacles to voting. The main provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
as amended, include Section 4, outlawing educational requirements for
voting in states or counties where less than 50 percent of the voting age
population had registered to vote as of November 1, 1964, or had voted in
the 1964 presidential election (Foster, 1985). Section 6 and 7 of the Act
give the Attorney General authority to assign federal registrars to enroll
voters (Foster, 1985). Section 2 creates a federal right of action to
challenge vote dilution (Foster, 1985). Section 5 requires the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General to approve or
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'preclear' all changes in voting practices in jurisdictions with a history of
discrimination (Foster, 1985). The preclearance requirement of section
5 has covered all or part of twenty-two states over the past 30 years
(Foster, 1985). Seven of the eleven states of the confederacy have been
continuously covered by the acts provisions: Alabama, Georgia,
Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, Virginia, and about half of the
counties in North Carolina (Foster 1985).
In response to the City of Mobile v. Boldern 446 U.S. 55 (1980)
decision, Congress passed the critically important 1982 amendment to
Section 2 prohibiting the drawing of electoral boundaries or the use of
other electoral devices that "result in a denial or abridgment of the
rights .... to vote on account of race or color." The 1982 amendment also
extended this element of the Voting Rights Act to all jurisdictions in the
country ( Foster, 1985).
The impact of the amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act on the
redistricting process was not intensely felt until the 1986 Thornburg v.
Gingles (478 U.S. 30, 1986) decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, which
established the precedence for proving a Section 2 violation in federal
court (Weber, 1995). The essence of a Section 2 claim, centered on the
Court's opinion on dilution. The Court concluded that "unlawful dilution of
the voting strength of racial minorities may be caused by the dispersal of
blacks into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of
voters or from the concentration of blacks into districts where they
constitute an excessive majority" (Thornburg v. Gingles 487 U.S. 30,
1986).This was seen by many in the political community as a warning to
states to create minority districts when ever possible. On the heels of the
Supreme Courts interpretation in Gingles of the legal meaning of Section
2, the Department of Justice (DOJ) arguable interpreted the Gingles
precedence as a signal for the DOJ to mandate more minority majority
districts by relating amended Section 2 to extended Section 5 (Weber,
1995). The result was the 1987 revised set of DOJ regulations governing
covered Section 5 jurisdictions, mandating the drawing of a minority
majority district in a covered state whenever voter dilution was in
question (Weber, 1995). This interpretation of the post Gingles amended
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Section 2 became the legal guideline used by the DOJ when it reviewed
congressional and state legislative plans submitted for the 1990s round
of redistricting (Weber, 1995).

Landmark U.S. Supreme Court Rulings
Redistricting
While the federal judiciary has in recent years become a prominent,
player in the congressional redistricting process, for most of the nation's
history the courts were content to be spectators, letting Congress set the
ground rules. In the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, congressional
redistricting was a "political thicket" (Covlegrove v. Green, 358 U.S. 1
(1946)that the courts should avoid. The Supreme Court by in large ignored
the issue of redistricting. It was not until the early 1960s that large
population disparities and a change in the ideology of the court, did the
Court hesitantly entered the realms of the "political Thicket", and thus
began the judicial journey towards ensuring that the African American
vote would have about the same impact as white votes.
Colegrove v. Green
The Court had not serious entertained a redistricting suit since it ruled in

1932

invalidating a Mississippi legislative map, with lines drawn of unequal population ( Cain &
Butler,

1991). However, in the case of Colegrove v. Green, 358 U.S. 1 (1946) a challenge to

the unequal population of Illinois districts was made and the Supreme Court undertook the
challenge. But the Supreme Court reaffirmed its laissez faire attitude towards redistricting by
dismissing the case. Justice Frankfurter warned that redistricting is a "political thicket" that
courts should avoid.

Gomillion

v.

Lightfoot

White Americans in the Old Confederate states were genuinely fearful of flying under
Black rule. In

1957 the white officials Tuskegee, Alabama attempted a drastic change in

electoral form to protect themselves from a possible African American majority. They

12 of its 400 African American voters.
In the case Gomillion v. Lightfoot 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the African American citizens of

gerrymandered the town's boundaries to remove all but

Tuskegee argued that the gerrymander had the effect of disenfranchising them. The supreme
Court struck down
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the gerrymandered district which began to lay the ground work for the Supreme Courts change
of heart in entertaining the issue of redistricting.

Baker v.

Carr

The Court's involvement in the 1962 Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186 (1962) decision
declared that the Federal branch does have jurisdiction over the issue of malapportionment.

Baker called for one person, one
vote and equality of the opportunity to vote. This ruling is "responsible for the presence of
blacks in every state courthouse and in positions of power throughout the land especially the
South," according to former Supreme Court Justice Brown (Texas Lawyer, 1990). TheBaker v.

Carr decision held that the claim of gross malapportionment of Tennessee's general assembly
denied equal protection due to vote dilution, presented a justifiable issue and, if discrimination
is sufficiently shown, setting the precedent that each persons vote must count the same as his
neighbor in every American election (Graham, 1972).

Grav v. Sanders
The developing jurisprudence of Baker v. Carr found its most clear pronunciation in

Gray v. Sanders

372 U.S. 368 (1963). The ruling in this Georgia case spells out in detail the

one person, one vote doctrine. Justice Douglas stated, "The conception of political equality from
the declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth
and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing -- one person, one vote" (372 U.S. 368
(1963).

Wesberrv

v.

Sanders

One year later involving another Georgia case, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in Wesberry v. Sanders

376 U.S. 1 (1964) was asked to determine whether the one person,

one vote doctrine pertaining to malapportionment in state legislatures also applied to the
Congress of the United States as well. The lower court in Georgia had dismissed the claim by
Wesberry that population disparities among Georgia congressional districts deprived voters of a
equally weighed vote. However Justice Black, writing for the Supreme Court majority held that
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution commands that as nearly as practicable, one person's vote
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. The court threw out the Georgia
map that had not been changed since 1931.

Revnolds v. Sims
That same year in Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533 (1964) the principle of one person
one vote was extended to congressional constituencies. A U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the
Alabama case rejected the argument that state senate districts, like the U.S. Senate, need not be
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apportioned on the basis of population. The decision required both upper and lower houses of
American state legislatures to be apportioned on the basis of population. The Supreme Court held
that even a popular referendum favoring unequal populations in electoral districts could not
supersede the individual voter's right to enjoy the constitutional one man, one vote principle.

David v. Bandemer
In the case of David v. Bandemer 478 U.S. 109 (1986) the highest court in the land
declared for the first time that partisan gerrymanders are subject to legal challenge. But, the
Court decides that the specific case before it, involving a GOP drawn legislative map in Indiana,
did not constitute a partisan gerrymander.

Shaw v. Reno
The stream of progress that began to flow in the 1960s towards a just democracy for
African Americans seems to have diverted. In the case Shaw v. Reno 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993),
the Supreme Court ruled that the white plaintiffs had standing to challenge the North Carolina
congressional plan, as a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment Right, and remanded the case
back to the lower court for trial. In announcing its decision in Shaw, a five to four majority of
the Court declared that a "plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatic irregular
shape, constitute an unconstitutional racial gerrymander" 113 S. Ct. at 2817 (1993). On
remand, a three-judge federal district court panel ruled that the plan was a racial
gerrymander, but that North Carolina had a compelling state interest in complying with the
Voting Rights Act and remedying a history of past discrimination in voting, and that the state had
narrOWly tailored a plan to fulfill those state interests (Shaw v Hunt, 861 F Supp 408, ED.
NC., 1994). In other cases raising a Shaw claim, a three-judge panel in California upheld the
congressional plan as well as the state Senate and House plans drawn by the state Supreme Court
as not constituting illegal racial gerrymanders ( Dewitt v Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, ED.. Ca.,
1994), while congressional districts in Louisiana, Texas and Georgia were invalidated by a
three judge federal court using Shaw criteria.
In the Hays v.. Louisiana (839 S. Ct. 2816, 1993), Vera v. Richards (861 F. Supp.
1304, S.D. Tex., 1994) and Johnson v. Miller (864 F. Supp. 1354, S.D. Ga., 1994) cases, the
three-judge panels agreed with Shaw that the equal protection claims were justifiable under
the 14th Amendment and that the burden of proof shifts to the state defendants to show that
racial gerrymandered plans were narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. The
states of Louisiana, Texas, and Georgia were unable to demonstrate their plans were narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling state interest. Thus, courts voided the plans, and ordered the three
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state legislatures to come up with revised plans. All three states appealed the decisions to the
U.S. Supreme Court, with the Miller v. Johnson case being the first U.S. Suprem Court casualty
of the post Shaw era.
Miller

v.

Johnson_

The case of Miller v. Johnson

U.S. 115 S. ct. 2475 (1995) was used by the Supreme

Court to clarify its stand on racial gerrymandering set forth in Reno v. Shaw. In this case, the
Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the lower court of Georgia, ruling that redistricting lines
could not be drawn solely on the basis of race.
The Shaw and Miller precedence and the increased judicial activism of the courts may
lead to increased congressional and state legislative plan challenges throughout the remainder of
the 1990s. The Shaw and Miller decision broke down the standing barrier for white persons so
that any oddly shaped district configuration and race based redistricting plans are likely to be
challenged in federal court under the 14th Amendment.
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The Review of the Literature discusses briefly the historical
background of the Congressional Black Caucus. Previous research on the
cohesive tendencies of the CBC' roll call vote behavior is included as
background into the CBC' voting agreement on legislation salient to all
Americans. Finally, previous research is provided pertaining to the CBC'
pivotal voting bloc influence.
In the past, studies have focused on the voting cohesion of the
Caucus in general. This study seeks to examine the CBC voting
cohesiveness and pivotal voting bloc influence on policy issues pertaining
particularly to the African American populace, to assess whether African
American congresspersons are essential to the passage of policy issues of
particular concern to African Americans during these 102nd and 103rd
Congresses.

Congressional Black Caucus
For a majority of the CSC' life, it existed as a peripheral entity
within the U.S. House. The CSC, originally entitled the Democratic Select
Committee, was later renamed the Congressional Black Caucus (Hatchett,
1986). It was formed by Michigan Representative Charles Diggs and twelve
other congresspersons in 1969 (Hatchett, 1986). These thirteen
individuals were compelled to operate as national spokes persons for more
than 25 million disgruntled African American citizens (Clay, 1992). The
committee's purpose was to facilitate communication between black
members of the House and the chamber's leadership and to help fill the
void left by the assassination of Dr. Martian Luther King Jr. (Hatchett,
1986). The CSC was conceived in the height of the civil rights movement
of the 1960s. The battle against racism and discrimination did not end at
the capital steps, instead it continued into the halls of Congress as the
eSc took on the self proclaimed role as the "conscious of the institution"
(Canon, 1995). At a time of the
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"us against them" philosophy, African American congresspersons banned
together in their war on discrimination. The Caucus produced a "Black
Agenda" during this time that was used as a legislative resource by the
Caucus members as to the concerns of the black community (Clay, 1992;
CBC, 1975). The Black Agenda was described by Amiri Baraka (1972); who
sat on the CBC foundation's board of directors, as an "attempt to define
some of the essential changes which must take place in this land as we
and our children move to self-determination and true independence... The
American system does not work for the masses of our people, and it
cannot be made to work without radical fundamental change ... Both parties
have betrayed us whenever their interests conflicted with ours, which
was most of the time" (Clay, 1992; p.203). This manifesto tackled the
issues of federal and domestic assistance programs; full employment; tax
reform; the budget and appropriations; universal voter registration;
general revenue sharing; health care; social insurance; education; and
individual legislative initiatives (CBC, 1975). Over the years the Caucus
gradually integrated itself into the Washington political circuit and by the
1980s established itself as the most relentless supporter of the rights of
minorities and the poor (Hatchet, 1986). Due to the 1990s round of
redistricting, the CBC has reached a critical mass; unprecedented
challenges face the CBC. They must contend with the political and
ideological views of the vastly expanded membership and the possibility
of internal and external Caucus conflicts of interest (Lusane, 1994; Clay,
1992). With this potential conflict comes greater pressure for the
members to vote along racial lines in order to obtain a high level of
cohesion.
Voting Cohesion
The membership of the CBC increased dramatically from the 102nd
to the 103rd Congress; however, as mentioned previously, this was still a
proportionately modest number for the countries largest minority of
nearly 34 million (Census Bureau, 1996). Although the Caucuses may have
been small in proportion, their presence as a cohesive unified voting bloc
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traditionally has been used to compensate for their lack of numbers (Gile
& Jones, 1995; Bositis, 1994; Jones, 1987). Author Susan Hammond (1983)
notes that race is a pivotal factor in black congressional solidarity due in
part to the historical oppression experienced by African American
citizens. Lucius Baker (1980), suggest that this common bond of the black
experience is the catalyst for the high levels of cohesion exhibited by the
CBC. These assessments are a logical explanation for the highly cohesive
voting behavior of the CBC through the years. However, political scientist
Charles Jones (1987) emphasis that the racial bond of blackness alone is
not the single factor of cohesion, citing party affiliation; the similarity
of the constituency characteristics; and the ideology predisposition of
group members, as additional factors. Jones' mention of party affiliation
was found to be a dominate factor in this study.
Following the 1992 elections and the start of the 103rd Congress,
there was much speculation in the media and among Washington
politicians as to whether Caucus members would vote collectively as
before, or whether the large influx of freshmen, women, and southern
members might create dissension in the Caucus as a voting bloc (Gile &
Jones, 1995). Research has found that the CBC has continued to vote
cohesively over the last few years (Canon, 1995; Gile & Jones, 1995;
Bositis, 1994). Voting cohesion research on the CBC is relatively new in
comparison to the CBC' years of existence. The CBC, for a majority of its
existence, was written off as weak and ineffective, existing as only a
peripheral entity within the House, and therefore generated little interest
to a majority of researchers (Swain, 1993). The increase in membership
that the late 1970s and 1980s signaled a shift in the CBC' visibility
(Loomis, 1981). There were an average of 15 CBC' members in the House
through the 1970s and 21 through the 1980, with the 1990s being its
largest membership to date (Canon, 1995). Prior research of the CBC'
cohesive voting patterns of its formative years by researchers Levy &
Stoudinger (1976) revealed that although a high degree of solidarity was
demonstrated amongst the 92nd Caucus, in terms of substantive
accomplishments, the Caucus was essentially ineffective. However, many
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sought to examine the continuality of the Caucus' allegiance over a longer
period of time.
A CSC voting cohesion study conducted by Charles Jones (1987),
examined the extent to which the CSC exhibited voting cohesion from the
94th Congress through the 96th, by examining the voting patterns of the
CSC across five different issue areas. Jones sought to prove that the CSC
would exhibit higher levels of cohesion than other informal organizations
in the House of Representatives. The findings concluded that the CSC was
overwhelmingly cohesive in its voting behavior, and that cohesiveness
was critical to their ability to operate as an effective force in the U.S.
congressional arena. A more exhaustive study by political scientists Gile
and Jones (1995) offers an examination of the CSC' voting cohesion
beginning with the formative years of 1971 through 1990. Roll call votes
over ten Congresses were examined. The results suggested that the CSC
voted as a cohesive voting unit, with the exception of only one occasion
(Gile & Jones, 1995). The study further concluded that the overwhelming
voting cohesion demonstrated by the CSC in its early years has continued
( Gile & Jones, 1995). Researcher David Canon (1995) explored the new
found power of the CSC. He examined the impact of the new black minority
majority CSC members on the power of the CSC; and the nature of black
representation in those districts. He concluded that the new size of the
cohesive CSC has substantially increased its political clout while
simultaneously pushing it into the political mainstream; and that newly
elected African Americans in Congress are more likely to promote the
politics of commonalty than the politics of difference (Canon, 1995). His
conclusions were based on an examination of the CSC' role in passing
legislation, their patterns of roll call voting, committee assignments, and
participation in the Democratic party leadership (Canon, 1995). Canon's
research on CSC cohesion was consistent with previous research
pertaining to CSC cohesion.
Researchers are becoming increasingly interested in the increased
voting power of the CSC in its post Thornburg era. Researcher David
Sositis (1994) examined the legislative voting records of the Caucus
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members during the first session of the 103rd Congress, using interest
group ratings and other devices. Caucus voting in 1993 was compared with
Caucus voting in 1992, as well as with the voting patterns of House
Democrats. Bositis concluded that in 1992 there was a remarkable level of
cohesion among Caucus members, except Republican Gary Frank (Bositis,
1994). On Presidential support, support for the conservative coalition, and
party unity, CBC members generally voted together, with no
differentiation between northern and southern voting behavior (Bositis,
1994).
Bositis (1994) found a high degree of continuity evident in the
Caucus' voting records between the 102nd and the 103rd Congresses. On
presidential support, support for the conservative coalition, and on party
unity, CBC members generally voted together (Bositis, 1994). Bositis also
made reference to the evaluative results conducted by various interest
groups pertaining to the voting records of CBC members. The political
interest group's study found that the voting records of CBC members in
1993 were similar to those in 1992, though a slight shift in a more liberal
direction may have developed (Bositis, 1994). The ratings of members on
economic, social, and foreign policy measures found the Caucus slightly
less liberal than in 1992, though still substantially liberal in its voting,
with the exception of Franks (Bositis, 1994). The most intriguing change
from 1992 to 1993 was in party unity, with Democrats as a group voting
in a more cohesive bloc in 1993 than 1992 in the second session of the
102nd Congress, the average Democrat supported the party on 79 percent
of all votes, Caucus Democrats averaged slightly higher with 83 percent
(Bositis, 1994). In 1993, party unity voting among all House Democrats
averaged 85 percent, and Caucus Democrats averaging 90 percent (Bositis,
1994). A roll call analysis of 87 key House votes from the first session of
the 103rd Congress revealed that for certain types of legislation the
Caucus was extremely cohesive with the CBC voting unanimously on 22 of
these votes (i.e. family planning, HUD) (Bositis, 1994). The Bositis study
reinforces the previous research in the CBC' cohesion and party allegiance.
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Pivotal

Bloc

Voting

As mentioned previously there has been limited hard statistical
research pertaining to the voting behavior of the CSC. In the 1990s
(particularly the 103rd CSC) the CSC has become a serious political voice,
and they are becoming an organization that must be increasingly dealt
with, due to their ability to influence legislation through their cohesive
voting bloc potential. Substantive data on the use of the CSC' cohesion as a
pivotal voting bloc is also limited. Only since the seating of the 103rd
Congress has their been much interest in assessing the CSC' direct
influence over the passage or rejection of House legislation. Research has
shown that the 103rd Congress has had some success in using its numbers
to bloc and pass key legislation (Swain, 1996; Canon, 1995). At one time
the House's attitude towards the CSC seemed to be: "Let them talk so we
can get back to business" (Hatchett, 1986; p. 19), viewing the Caucus only
as a paper lion. With the CSC' incremental rise in numbers, came a new
and forced respect for the opinion of the African American
congresspersons. The words of former Caucus leader Kweisi Mfume are
indicative of the caucuses new no-nonsense approach; "No longer are we
going to be looked at as an addendum to the democratic agenda. We are
going to be taken seriously. Anything short of partnership could prompt us
to respond in kind. If that means killing an important piece of legislation,
then that will be the case" (Lusane, 1994; p. 20), and they have done just
that.
The 103rd CSC has played a pivotal role in shaping and then passing
House legislation on the budget, the space station, crime, and campaign
finance reform, making tough demands on behalf of their African American
constituents (Swain, 1996, Canon, 1995). According to researcher David
Canon (1995) the 1993 budget was of particular salience to the CSC,
unanimously threatening the survival of the legislation unless key
revisions were made (Canon, 1995). They demanded increased funding for
inner cities, the earned- income tax credit, food stamps, and mandatory
immunization for poor children (Canon, 1995). Though the budget proposal
was not amended to include all of the CSC' demands, they considered the
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final budget concessions as a major victory for African Americans (Canon,
1995). The Caucus dealt a critical blow to President Clinton's crime bill,
when they, along with Republicans and conservative Democrats voted down
the rule needed to bring the crime bill to the House floor, however after
tough negotiations on the sentencing provisions, they were instrumental
to its passage (Canon, 1995). The CBC was pivotal to the successful
passage of the space station, the nation's highest priced science project,
which survived by a single vote in 1993, and used its votes to protect PAC
contributions in the House's November 1993 campaign finance reform,
which are critical to a black political candidate's ability to construct a
serious campaign (Canon,1995). The CBC is also helping promote
legislation on banking issues, welfare reform, and environmental justice
(dumping toxic waste in poor, black areas) (Canon, 1995 ). Now able to
seriously influence legislation, the CBC is a force to be respected.
As Canon demonstrates, the ability to deliver a bloc of votes
enhances the bargaining leverage of the CBC ( Darden, 1984 ). Alan Fiellin
(1984) notes that "Votes are a common medium of exchange in political
bargaining and the ability to deliver a large block of votes may contribute
heavily in bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion (Darden,1984 ).
As such, the CBC demonstrated its ability to negotiate through its stalling
of the 1993 Budget as mentioned previously. There are a number of ways
bloc voting can be construed as pivotal. One definition Canon (1995) cites
is when the CBC would have "altered the outcome by switching their
votes"; under this definition the CBC could have altered the outcome on
186 of the 822 roll calls between January 5, 1993 and June 30, 1994 (p.
165), Another definition of Canon's (1995) is when "the outcome of the
vote would have changed if the member of the CBC would have abstained,
rather than voting in favor"; under this definition, the CBC played a pivotal
role on 56 of the 822 votes Canon examined (p. 165). However, for the
purpose of this paper a third and most restrictive definition is employed.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
This study's hypothesis is: the votes of African American
Congresspersons are more likely to be essential to the House passage of
policy issues salient to the African American populace, based on previous
evidence. It is expected that both the 102nd and the 103rd CBC will be
found to be a distinct voting bloc whose degree of cohesion is high.
However, over all, their votes and high level of cohesion will have only a
minimal effect on the passage of policy issues salient to the black
community, due to a high level of voting cohesion exhibited by both the
102nd and 103rd non-caucus House Democrats in the promotion of the
corresponding issues. To determine the CBC' operational success, the level
of cohesion manifested by the Caucus on salient black issues and the
occasions where CBC votes were essential (pivotal) to the outcome of the
issues will be used as a gauge of the CBC' essentiality. CBC roll call votes
serve as the independent variable. A measure of cohesion and pivotal
influence concerning issues salient to the Black community serve as
dependent variables. According to Jones (1987) CBC voting cohesion is
defined as "the extent to which members of a group vote in agreement
with one another" (p. 29). Canon (1995) defines CBC voting as pivotal if
"the outcome would have been reversed if their votes in favor of the
winning side were subtracted and replaced with the average position of
the non-Black Democrats who voted on the winning side of the bill"
(p. 167). These definitions will also apply in this study. To assess the
level of voting cohesion and the pivotal voting bloc potential of the 102nd
and 103rd Democratic Congress, an analysis of their voting behavior will
be based upon patterns in roll call votes selected from the Congressional
Quarterly Report . Where previous studies have focused on the over all
level of cohesion of the CBC members concerning all roll call legislation
over a given period of time, this study charts a new and narrower course
by choosing roll call votes of the Democratic Congresses that pertain to
issues of concern to Black America in particular, as deemed so by the CBC'
self proclaimed "Black Agenda" and determining if those votes were
pivotal to the passage of the particular legislation (Clay, 1992; CBC,
1975). The operational rules employed to select the roll call votes were:
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1.

2.

3.

Only the roll call votes involved the passage of Amendments,
committee reports and legislation salient to the African American
populous are to be examined.
Since voting agreement is being determined, usually unanimous
votes are not considered because the level of agreement cannot be
effectively determined in the absence of disagreement(Gile & Jones,
1995). However, for this study unanimous votes will be considered
because this study seeks to examine the CBC' pivotal voting bloc
potential, which most likely will require the unanimous vote of the
CBC.
The roll call votes of House Republican and CBC member Gary Franks
will not be considered in accessing CBC cohesion or pivotal voting of
either Caucuses, because Franks is an atypical member. For, the CBC
never votes with a majority of the Republicans on pivotal issues
(Canon, 1995).

A total of 6153 House Democratic roll call votes were considered
and were categorized into three major issue areas and covered votes on
the following policy dimensions (similar to Gile & Jones, 1985, Levey &
Stroudinger, 1976, and to Jones, 1987, each of whom used four or five):
General

District of Columbia, motor voter, foreign affairs

Social

civil rights and liberties, education, benefits, law and
order issues

Monetary

appropriations (not specifically related to another
issue area) and other monetary or fiscal issues

Because different policy issues might expectantly produce different
voting patterns of cohesion, selected roll call votes were categorized into
the three issue areas. This categorization will prove useful in this study
because references to a particular group's overall cohesion in certain
policy areas will be made.
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Scores for group cohesion were calculated according to the Rice
Index of Cohesion (Rice, 1969). The index has a range of 0 to 100 based on
the following formula:
("yes" votes - 'no" votes )
Total number of votes
A measure of cohesion is defined as "the degree of departure from
the most probable chance distribution of votes (Le. 50-50, which yields a
score of zero); hence maximum cohesion (100) is attained whenever the
group is in total agreement or total disagreement" (Rice, 1969; P. 208). A
high level of agreement is defined as a cohesion score between 75 and
100; a low level was defined as less than 50 (Gile & Jones, 1995). The
average cohesion for each issue was calculated (for each Caucus) by
summing the individual roll calls and dividing the number of votes per
issue. A comprehensive average score per issue area will be calculated by
summing the individual roll calls (of each Caucus)in a given issue area and
dividing the number of votes per issue area.
Cohesion scores for the non-Caucus House Democrats were also
calculated and used to gauge the extent of support to which the non-CSC
members gave the corresponding legislation salient to African Americans
using the above method.
The objective of this study is not to make sweeping empirical
conclusions about the Caucus' ability to legislate on behalf of African
Americans. In light of the recent controversy surrounding the new
minority majority districts, this study seeks only make a limited
assessment of the two Congresses directly involved in the race
redistricting debate, to determining whether the votes of the African
American congresspersons are even necessary to pass House issues
salient to the African American community.
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Table 1
Cohesion Scores: all Issue Areas

I.
I

I
I
I

Issue
Congress

41.4
87.5
84.2
100.
96.6
91.4

Issues

N

CBC
Mean

HR 3371
HR 1
HR 3040
HR 3033
HR2
HR7

18
24
24
23
24
24

66.6
100.
100.
100.
83.3
91.6.

239
241
228
239
238
163

Monetary

HR 4210
HeR 121
HR 2100
HR 2519
HR 1281

24
22
17
24
23

50.0
90.9
100
83.3
100

241 66.8
235 70.2
215
.8
228
7.8
233 76.9

General

HR 3844
HR 2508

24
24

100
100

208
131

Area

102nd
(1991-1992)
Social

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

N

Non
Democrats
Mean

67.3
57.2
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I

Table 1 ( con't)
Cohesion Scores: all Issue Areas

I

I
I

I

Issue

CBC
Congress

Area

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

N

Mean

N

------------------------------------------------------ ---
103rd
(1993-1994)
Social

HR 920
HR 3351
HR 670
HR 1025
HR1
HR 1804

37
36
37
37
36
37

100
100
89.1
94.5
100
100

209
213
212
216
217
218

80.8
92.6
75.4
37.0
73.2
99.0

103rd
(1993-1994)Monetary HR 2264
HR 3400

37
37

100
100

221
221

62.6
48.4

33
37
37
36

51.5
100
100
100

209 69.3
219 41.0
215 91.1
212 91.5

I
I

I

Issues

Non
Democrats
Mean

General

HR4
HR 51
HR2
SJR 45
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I
I
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Table 2
Social
102nd
HR 3371. the Fairness in Death and Sentencing Act. This

amendment

sought to replace the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, which allows minorities to challenge a
death sentence as discriminatory if statistics show a disproportionate number of their race
being condemned to die, with the Equal Justice Act, which prohibits the consideration of race in
determining a defendant's sentence and the use of statistics to invalidate a sentence. The
substitution was adopted 223-191.

HR 1. Civil Rights Act of 19911Passage. This bill sought to reverse or modify a
series of Supreme Court rUlings that narrowed the reach and remedies of job discrimination
laws and two authorize compensatory and punitive for victims of discrimination based on sex,
religion or disability. The bill passed 273-158.

HR 3040. Unemployment Benefits ExtensionlPassage. This bill sought to
permanently extend unemployment benefits to long-term unemployed workers for up to 20
additional weeks. It passed 283-125.
HR 3033. Job Training Partnership actlPassage. This bill is aimed at
retraining economically disadvantaged individuals who are unprepared to compete in the job
market. It passed 420-6.
HR 2. Family and Medical Leave ActlRule. This bill sought adoption of the rule
(H Res 275) to provide for House consideration of the bill to require workers with more than
50 employees to provide up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave a year for serious illness, to care
for a new child, to care for a seriously ill child, spouse or parent. It was adopted 269-156.

HR 7. Handgun Waiting PeriodlPassage. This bill requires a seven day waiting
period for gun purchases, allowing local law enforcement authorities to check the background of
prospective buyers to determine whether they have a criminal record. It passed. 239-186.
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103rd

HR 920. Unemployment Benefits Extension/Passage. A bill to provide $5.7
billion to allow for the processing of claims from March 6 through Ocl. 2 for federal extended
emergency unemployment benefits. It passed 254-161.

HR 3351. Youth Offenders alternative Punishment/Passage. This bill
authorizes $200 million per year for fiscal year 1994-96 in grants to states for alternative
punishment programs, it passed 336-82.

HR 670. Family Planning Amendments/Passage. This bill codifies the Clinton
administration's lifting of the "gag rule" that prohibited staff at federally funded clinics from
discussing abortion. It passed 273-149.

HR 1025. Brady Bill/Passage. Passage of this bill requires a five-business-day
waiting period before an individual could purchase a handgun to allow official to run a
background check. It passed 238-189.

HR 1. Family and Medical Leave/Passage. This bill requires employers of more
than 50 employees to provide twelve weeks of unpaid leave for illness or to care for a new child
or sick family member. It passed 265-163.

HR 1804. School Improvement/Substitute. This substitution amendment would
allow local communities to define "school choice" to include private schools; require 25 percent
of federal funds to be spent on school choice programs by school districts and add provisions to
strengthen parental control of education. It was rejected 130-300.
Monetary
102nd

HR 4210. 1992 Tax Bill/passage. This bill sought to increase taxes on the rich,
while lowering taxes for the poor by giving workers a temporary tax credit worth up to
$400.00 per couple and $200.00 for individuals a year. It passed 221-209.
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H Con Res 121. Fiscal 1992 Budget Resolution/Education Increases. This
amendment sought to increase the budget authority target for education, training, employment
and social services by $400 million and the outlay target by $200 million, permitting
additional funding for Head Start, chapter 1 Compensatory Education, student financial aid,
vocational and adult education and job corp. It was adopted 261-158.

HR 2100. Fiscal 1992 Defense Authorization/SOl. This amendment sought to
terminate the Strategic Defense Initiative program and permit only a basic SDI research
program funded at $1.1 billion. It was rejected 118-266.

HR

2519.

Fiscal

1992 HUD Appropriations/Restore Space station

Funding. This amendment sought to provide $1.9 billion for the space station Freedom and to
cut $217 million from public housing operating subsidies. It was adopted 240-173.

HR

1281.

Fiscal

1991

Supplemental

Appropriations/Housing.

This

amendment sought to provide $500 million for the HOME program (Home Investment
Partnership), and $165 million for Hope (Home ownership and Opportunity for people
everywhere). It was rejected 177-240.
103 rd

HR 2264. Fiscal 1993 BUdget Reconciliation/Passage. The bill sought to
reduce the deficit by an estimated $496 billion over five years through almost $242 billion in
additional taxes and $225 billion in spending cuts. It was passed 219-213.
HR 3400. Reinventing Government and Spending Cuts/ Penny-Kaslch
Amendment. an amendment to cut federal spending by $90 billion over five years through
various proposals, including Medicare and other entitlement programs. It was rejected 213
219.
General
102nd
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HR 3844. Haitian Refugee Protection legislation

suspends for six months the

reparation of Haitians who were in the custody of the united states before Feb. 5, 1992. The bill
passed 217-165.

HR

2508.

Fiscal

1992-93 Foreign Aid

Authorization/South

Africa. T his

substitute amendment prohibits aid to South African Communist Party and to any organization
or association affiliated with a communist party and to require the president to ensure that
recipients of aid have democratic processes in place for selecting leaders and do not have a
record of human rights abuses. It was adopted 279-134.
103rd

HR 4.

National

Institutes of Health Reauthorization/Instruct Conferees. A

motion to instruct the House conferees to agree to the senate amendment to prevent the
permanent immigration of persons infected with the HIV virus, namely Haitians. It passed 356
58.
HR 51. DC. Statehood/Passage. This bill would admit the District of Columbia into
the union as the state of New Columbia. It was rejected 153-277.
HR 2 National motor -Voter Registration/Conference Report.

The adoption

of the conference report on the bill to require states to allow citizens to register to vote when
they are applying for a driver's license, at any agency providing public assistance, and through
the mail. It was adopted 259-164.
S J Res 45. Somalia Troop Authorization/Passage. Passage of the bill to
authorize under War Powers Resolution the previous deployment of U.S. Troops in Somalia and
to authorize for one year after enactment the continued U.S. participation in a U.N. led
peacekeeping mission in Somalia. It passed 243-179.
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FINDINGS
·See Tables 1 & 2 for group cohesion scores and a
description of the issues

SOCIAL
102nd
The fairness in Death and Sentencing Act was adopted 223
191. This issue is extremely controversial because a disproportionate
number of defendants sentenced to death are African Americans (Barkan,
1994). However, there appears to be a considerable amount of
disagreement among the Caucus members present in the roll call votes.
The CBC with a cohesion score of 66.6, did not satisfy the minimum
criterion (75-100) designating a high level of voting cohesion. Non-Caucus
Democrats, with a voting cohesion score of 41.4, exhibit an surprisingly
low level of agreement on this issue. The lack of cohesion by both the CBC
and non-CBC Democrats contribute to the adoption of this legislation. The
CBC would not have played a pivotal role in the passage of this issue
regardless of its ability to exhibit a cohesion score of 66.6 or even a
perfect score of 100.
The CBC' cohesion score for the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is 100.,
which is consistent with their self-proclaimed fight for additional
African American civil rights (Hatchett, 1993). The non-CBC Democrats
also exhibit a high level of voting agreement with a score of 87.5. The
Amendment passed 273-158. The cohesion level of the CBC has no direct
bearing on the passage of this issue, for it would have passed with or
without any of the CBC members voting in favor of it.
Unemployment is a big concerns of the CBC members and their
constituents, for a disproportionate number of the unemployed are African
American (Jenson, 1994)). The Unemployment benefits Extension
Passage bill passed 283-125, with unanimous support from the CBC. This
legislation was also salient amongst non-CBC Democrats, with a cohesion
score of 84.2. The unanimous bloc of CBC votes are not pivotal to the
passage of this legislation, due to the non-CBC' high level of cohesion.
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As mention previously unemployment is extremely salient to CBC
members and their constituents. The Job Training Partnership
Act/Passage sailed through the House with a vote of 420-6. The CBC and
non-CBC democrats both exhibit a cohesion score of 100. This high level of
cohesion emphasizes the Democratic parties commitment to the
unemployed or unemployable. Because of the Houses unanimous agreement
on this issue, the cohesive voting bloc of the CBC is not pivotal to the
passage of this issue.
African Americans have become the fastest growing population in
the United states (Census Bureau, 1996). With the growth of the Black
family the CBC has continuously voiced its commitment to the upliftment
of the Black family. Therefore, it was surprising to uncover the erratic
voting behavior of the Caucus members pertaining to the Family and
Medical Leave Act/Rule. The rule passed 269-156, but not without
opposition from CBC members. though they exhibit a high level of voting
cohesion with a score of 83.3. This study had expected to uncover a
unanimous bloc of votes. The non-CBC Democrats championed the cause
superbly with a score of 96.6. With the high level of voting cohesion
demonstrated by the non-CBC Democrats, the votes of the CBC, regardless
of the level of cohesion, are not pivotal to the passage of the issue.
Gun violence has reached epidemic proportions in the African
American community (Henderson, 1993). African American constituents
are demanding that their congresspersons take action against the violence
that rages in their communities. Therefore, it was no surprise that the
CBC placed considerable value in the Hand Gun Waiting
Period/Passage, by exhibiting a cohesion score of 91.6. The bill passed
by a vote of 239-186, with little opposition from House Democrats, who
also reached a high level of agreement with a score of 91.4. Because of the
high level of voting cohesion exhibited by non-caucus Democrats, the
votes of the CBC are again not pivotal to the passage of the legislation.
103rd
Employment issues were also salient to the Democratic House
members of the 103rd Congress. The Unemployment Benefits
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Extension/Passage was passed 254-161. The CSC members voted
unanimously in favor of the bills passage; while the non-CSC democrats
also exhibit a high level of cohesion with a score of 80.8. No votes of the
CSC are pivotal to the passage of this legislation; due in part to the
cohesiveness of the non-CSC Democrats.
Youth offenders constitute a majority of criminal offenders in the
United States (Duster, 1987). Secause a substantial number of criminal
offenders are African American (Duster, 1987), the Youth Offender
Alternative Punishment bill would be very important to the African
American populous. The bill passed 336-82 with the CSC exhibiting a
perfect score of cohesion. The level of non-CSC democrat cohesion was
extremely high with a score of 96.2. Again, the CSC voting bloc is not
critical to the outcome of this legislation.
Unexpected pregnancy is a problem prevalent amongst African
American teenage women (Jacob, 1994). Therefore, the Family Planning
Amendments/Passage is important to many in the African American
community because it allows physicians to discuss the procedure of
abortion as an alternative to carrying a fetus to full term. The bill passed
273-149. The CSC reached a high level of agreement on this issue with a
score of 89.1. The non-CSC Democrats also reached a high level of
agreement exhibiting a cohesion score of 75.4. The High level of voting
cohesion amongst the non-CSC Democrats was sufficient to pass the
legislation without any assistance from the Caucus.
The CSC continued its support for gun control in the 103rd Congress
with its highly cohesive score of 94.5 pertaining to the Srady Bill
passage 238-189. The support by non-Caucus Democrats took a sharp dive
from that of the 103rd's support for gun control. The non-Caucus
Democrats exhibit a cohesion score of 37.0. However, their low level of
cohesion was countered by a high level of voting cohesion from House
Republicans, so high, that the votes of CSC member are not pivotal to the
passage of the bill.
The Family and medical Leave bill received full support from the
103rd Caucus contrary to the rule vote of the 102nd, with a cohesion
score of 100. The non-Caucus Democrats exhibit a moderate level of
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voting agreement with a cohesion score of 72.2. The bill passed 265-163.
The votes of the CBC are not pivotal to the passage of this legislation.
The idea of school choice has become a hot issue in the 1990s. The
defeat of the School Improvement /Substitute was a top priority of
the CBC members because of the negative impact it could have on the
public school system, where a majority of African American children are
taught. The amendment was rejected 130-300, with the CBC voting
unanimously and the non-CSC Democrats also exhibiting a high level of
cohesion with a score of 99.0 on the issue. The unanimous voting bloc of
the CBC are not pivotal to the passage of this issue.

MONETARY
102nd
A large percentage of African Americans are designatej as low or
low to middle income wage earners (Lusane, 1994). The CBC has always
sought to reduce the economic strain African Americans have experience
in the U.S. economic system, the 1992 Tax Bill does just that by
lowering the taxes of the indigent. The measure passed 221-209, but
surprisingly, not without considerable opposition from CBC members. The
CBC exhibits a low level of voting cohesion on this issue with a score of
50.0. The non-CSC Democrats are a bit more cohesive with a score of 66.8,
still falling short of the high cohesion designation. Because of the
moderate level of support for this issue by non-CSC Democrats, the CBC
became pivotal to the passage of this legislation. The bill passed by a vote
of 221-209. Democrats supported the measure by a 219-46 margin with
the CSC voting in favor (19-5). Therefore, non-CSC Democrats supported
the bill by 200-46 margin. If the CBC members would have voted for the
bill by a 7-17 margin, the bill would have been defeated 209-221.
Education and training are crucial issue of the CSC' agenda. The
CSC has been know to be the champion of educational programs such as the
Head Start program and adult education. Therefore the Fiscal 1992
Budget Resolution/Education Increase was a top priority of the CSC
which is demonstrated by their highly cohesive voting score of 90.9. The
non-CSC Democrats place a moderate level of value in the passage of this
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amendment with a score of 70.2. The Amendment passed 261-158. Not one
of the CSC votes is pivotal to the passage of this legislation.
The CSC has been extremely vocal in its condemnation of excessive
defense appropriations. Therefore it is no surprise that they exhibit a
perfect score of cohesion in support of the Fiscal 1992 Defense
Authorization/SOl amendment that would have cut defense spending.
The non-CSC members were rigidly set against the possibly of defense
cuts, exhibiting a extremely low cohesion score of .8. The Amendment was
rejected 118-226, due to the non-Caucus Democrat's lack of support on
this issue.
Acquiring affordable housing can be a major problem for many
African Americans. Therefore the defeat of the Fiscal 1992 HUD
Appropriations Amendment, which sought to cut millions in public
housing appropriations, was an important issue for many African
Americans. The CSC exhibits a high level of voting agreement with a score
of 83.3. conversely, the non-CSC Democrats exhibit an extremely low level
of voting agreement with a score of 07. The amendment was adopted 240
173, due to the lack of value the non-CSC democrats placed in the passage
of the legislation.
The fiscal 1991 Supplemental Appropriations/housing
amendment was an important issue to African Americans for the same
reason listed above. The CSC voted unanimously in favor of the amendment
and the non-CSC democrats also exhibit a high level of agreement with a
cohesion score of 76.9. However, the legislation was rejected 177-240, in
part because of strong Republican opposition.

103 rd
The Fiscal Year 1993 Budget Reconciliation/Passage sought
to enact substantial spending cuts that would have had far reaching
affects in the African American community. However, the CSC exhibits a
highly cohesive score of 100, supporting the passage of the issue after
intense negotiations that revised the bill to be more sensitive to the poor.
The non-CSC Democrats demonstrate a moderate level of voting cohesion
with a score of 62.6. Secause of the non-CSC Democrat's moderate
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support, the cohesive CSC became pivotal to the passage of the bill. The
issue was adopted 219-213. Democrats supported the bill by a 219-38
margin, with the CSC unanimously in favor (37-0). Therefore non-CSC
Democrats supported the bill by a 182-38 margin. If the CSC members
would have voted for the bill 31-6, the bill would have been defeated 213
219.
The Penny-Kasich Amendment, like the 1993 budget bill sought
to cut spending in a way that would have dramatically affected the poor.
The CSC mobilized against the amendment exhibiting a perfect score of
cohesion. the non-CSC Democrats however, exhibit a low level of
agreement with a score of 48.4. The low level of salience the non-CSC
Democrats afford this issue, resulted in the cohesive CSC becoming a
pivotal player in the defeat of the amendment. The amendment was
rejected 213-219. The Democrats supported the issue 57-200 with the
CSC unanimously rejecting the Amendment 0-37. Therefore the non-CSC
Democrats supported the issue by a 57-163 margin. If the CSC would have
voted 6-31 the bill would have survived 219-213.

GENERAL
102nd
The plight of black people out side of North America has always been
of concern to the CSC and their constituents. From the plight of Haitian
refugees to the economic and social condition of African people, has
caused the CSC has lead the way in the protection of the people of these
lands (Canon, 1995). The Haitian refugee Protection legislation and
the Fiscal 1992-93 Foreign Aid authorizationl South African
amendment, were two issues that were voted on unanimously by the CSC,
passing 217-165 and 279-134 respectively. However, the non-CSC
Democrats scored considerably lower with a cohesion score of 67.3 for
Haitian protections and 57.2 for South African aid. Though the non-CSC
level of agreement was low, the voting bloc of the CSC is not pivotal to
the outcome of the issues.
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103rd
As mentioned previously, the CSC has vowed its commitment to the
plight of blacks not only in the United States, but in other countries as
well. The National Institutes of Health Reauthorization/Instruct
Conferees preventing HIV positive immigrants, namely Haitians, from
entering the United States, passed 356-58. In spite the CSC' previous
support of Haitian matters, it seemed to be divided over the issue
exhibiting a moderate to low level cohesion score of 51.5. The non-CSC
members were a bit more cohesive than the CSC with a cohesion score of
69.3 The votes of the CSC are not pivotal to the passage of this issue.
The African American population of Washington DC. is now over
65.0% of District's population (Census Sureau, 1996). Having gone its
entire existence without voting representation in Congress, the push for
DC. statehood has continued to grow just as the black population has. DC.
Statehood has been an important issue among CSC members and African
Americans. Lately the possibility of Jesse Jackson being elected to the
Senatorial seat upon the admission of the District of Columbia as a union
state, has sparked renewed interest in the status of DC. amongst Slacks
(Walker, 1992). The CSC members exhibit a perfect cohesion score of 100.
on the issue. However, the non-CSC Democrats exhibit extremely low
voting agreement pertaining to the passage with a score of 41.0. The bill
was rejected 153-277. The unanimous votes of the CSC are not pivotal to
the outcome of the bills passage.
The National Motor -Voter Registration/Conference Report
was adopted 259-164. This adoption was important to the CSC as a
procedural step in the fight to make voter registration more accessible to
the African Americans electorate (Dreier, 1994). The CSC voted
unanimously in favor of the legislation and the non-CSC Democrats also
exhibit a high level of voting agreement with a cohesion score of 91.1.
With the high level of non-CSC voting agreement, the voting bloc of the
CSC members is not pivotal to the passage of this issue.
As mentioned earlier the social and economic condition of African
people are of great concern to CSC members. The Somalia Troop
authorization/Passage was supported by CSC members unanimously.
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The non-CBC members also exhibit a high level of voting agreement with a
cohesion score of 91.5. The votes of the CBC members are not essential to
the passage of this bill.
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CONCLUSIONS

The findings of this study support my expectation that the votes of
the African American congresspersons are essential to the House passage
of policy issues salient to the African American community. Overall, the
102nd CBC is highly cohesive in the social (75.7) and general (100.) areas;
and exhibit a low level of cohesion in the monetary (54.5) area. The 103rd
CBC overall is highly cohesive in the monetary (100.) area; but exhibit a
moderate level of cohesion in the social (63.6) and general (65.0) areas.
The 102nd non-CBC Democrats are highly cohesive in the social (98.3) and
monetary (88.5) areas; and exhibit a overall low level of cohesion in the
general (63.4) area. The 103rd non-CBC Democrats are highly cohesive in
the monetary (97.9) area; and exhibit a low over all level of cohesion in
the social (45.6) and general (65.5) areas. These erratic levels of overall
cohesion exhibited by the CBC are inconsistent with this study's
expectations. The study had expected to find a high level of cohesion in
Virtually every policy area of black concern. This expectation was based
on the conclusions of previous studies demonstrating high levels of
cohesion by the CBC members over the years.
This study's assertion that African American congresspersons are
essential to the House passage of policy issue salient to the Black
community, is supported by the votes of the 102nd CBC members being
pivotal to the passage of the Tax Bill; and the votes of the 103rd CBC
members being pivotal to the passage of the 1993 Budget and the Penny
Kasich Amendment. However, these three occasions that the CBC' votes
were pivotal could be considered by many to be American concerns and not
particularly African American concerns.
Though the CBC was pivotal on the previously mentioned occasions,
the non-eBC Democrats, functioning at various levels of cohesion, were
overwhelmingly responsible for the passage of a majority of the issue
salient to African Americans. Undoubtedly because a majority of the
African Americans electorate affiliate themselves with the Democratic
Party, Democrats have become more willing to support policy issues of
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concern to African American populace (Whitby, 1987). This data could lead
this study to conclude that though the votes of black congresspersons
were pivotal on occasions, they are not essential to ensure House passage
of a majority of policy issues salient to the African American community;
for non-CSC Democrats do an adequate job of promoting and preserving
issues salient to the African American populous.
However, this study also reveals that the 102nd CSC ended up on the
losing side of four issues and the numerically inflated 103rd ended up on
the losing end on two occasion. Of the six issues that the CSC lost, the
Fairness in Sentencing Act, defense cuts, HUD appropriation reductions,
housing appropriation, HIV immigrants and DC. statehood, three of the
issues are particularly black oriented. The Fairness in Sentencing Act, HIV
immigrants and DC. statehood all have a direct affect on black people in
particu lar.
The 103rd CSC was more successful in its promotion of salient
black issues than the 102nd CSC, in part because of its increased
membership. If the 103rd Caucus had remained at its previous 102nd
membership status, the 24 voting members, regardless of their level of
cohesion, would not have played a pivotal role in the passage of any of the
legislation considered.
Non-CSC Democrats failed to support the CSC on issues that were of
greatest concern to black people. Therefore, based on these findings this
study concludes that not only are the votes of CSC members necessary, but
more African American congresspersons, who are sensitive to black
issues and who are willing to vote cohesively with the CSC, are needed to
seriously promote and preserve legislation of the most importance to
African Americans.
Future research to ascertain the level of voting support, prior to
redistricting, Caucasian Representatives of the controversial minority
majority districts gave to policy issues salient to the Slack community
would be beneficial. This research would assist in the determination of
whether it is necessary to have African American representatives in order
to receive unconditional voting support for policy issues of African
American concern.
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